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This paper will recount the stages of communist resistance in France during World War Two and its 
relationship to the French Resistance overall, as well as analyse the effect that communist resistance 
in France had on the war. It will outline the position of the French Communist Party (PCF) in three 
different and distinctive periods: pre-1939, 1939 to the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, and 
from Operation Barbarossa to the liberation of France. This paper uses primary and secondary 
sources to create as balanced and objective an essay as possible. It will show that, for most of its 
existence, the PCF had been operating in a clandestine state and was thus the best prepared of any 
group for the outbreak of hostilities. The Communists were not necessarily late in joining the war, 
with resistance as we know it only beginning when the Communists began to resist. The relationship 
between the communist resisters and the other resistance groups is discussed, with particular 
reference to de Gaulle and shows the large degree of autonomy that the Communists maintained. 
What can be said with certainty of communist resistance in France is that it prevented greater 
casualties among the Allies through its acts of sabotage and its engagement of the enemy. This 
dissertation challenges the myth of the French Resistance and asserts that the Communists had the 
greatest influence of any group in the Resistance. 
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This paper will recount the stages of communist resistance in France and its relationship to 
the French Resistance overall, as well as analyse the effect that communist resistance in 
France had on the war. It will outline the position of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 
three different and distinctive periods: pre-1939, 1939 to the German invasion of the USSR in 
1941, and from the launch of Operation Barbarossa to the liberation of France. It will suggest 
a link between the Communist Party’s position in the Popular Front Government of the mid 
1930s and the position it found itself in following the German invasion of France and the 
Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. It will show that the Communist Party was arguably the 
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best suited group to operate an effective resistance to Vichy and the Nazis as not only had it 
been marginalised and oppressed by the French state since its conception, but it was also 
banned by Daladier’s government in 1939 and was, thus, accustomed to operating 
clandestinely. The paper will contend that communist resistance only began to occur 
following the invasion by Germany of the Soviet Union, it will outline the influence of the 
Communist International on the French Communist Party and it will highlight the effect that 
the French Communist Party leader, Maurice Thorez, had on his party, given that he spent the 
entire war in Moscow. It will show that when the Communists did begin to resist, they 
quickly became arguably the most proactive group in the Resistance. The paper will outline 
the relationship that the communist resisters had with the other resistance groups and 
particularly with de Gaulle and it will contend that, although it agreed to join the Conseil 
National de la Resistance, in reality the PCF retained almost the same degree of autonomy 
and, despite the glaring ideological differences between them, the relationship between de 
Gaulle and the Communists was not as strained as one might believe. It will also be shown 
that communist activity sometimes harmed the Resistance; carrying out assassinations was 
not always welcomed by the French as retaliation for killing German soldiers was generally 
inflicted on the local population. It will be suggested that the Service du travail obligatoire 
(STO) programme, the German occupation of the southern zone, and German reprisals and 
brutality, caused a significant rise in civil disobedience and increased support for the 
communist resisters. Finally, the paper will contend that the PCF’s significant role in the 
Resistance led to its acceptance into the folds of French society and politics in a way that it 
had never been before and was the most important factor in its rise in popularity, becoming 
the largest left-wing French party until the 1970s. 
When the Communists eventually entered the war in the summer of 1941, they were 
arguably the group that was most capable of engaging in an effective resistance, for they had 
significant experience in operating on the margins of society, as well as being oppressed and 
hunted by the State. Sean McMeekin tells us of Henri Barbe, one of the main leaders of the 
PCF after 1928, and his pursuit by the French authorities: “From 1928 to 1933 Barbe was 
pursued by the French authorities for various offences that together merited thirteen years in 
prison, Barbe was escorted around the PCF's network of safe houses by a veritable team of 
agents when in the country.”
1
 McMeekin also informs us of Albert Vassart, Paris liaison for 
the Comintern from 1932 to 1934, who used encryption techniques in telegraphing messages 
between Paris and Moscow, and assisted “the distribution of false passports, ‘specially 
prepared’ suitcases and travel clothes with secret pockets to French agents going abroad.”
2
 
Although both of these individuals were forced to leave the party and became collaborationist 
and anti-communist during the war, we can see from their experiences that French 
communists already had a network of safe houses and systems of remaining undetected by 
enemy agents. It is possible to say that the Communists were already operating in a mild state 
of war, so when they began to engage in hostilities in 1941 they possessed a skillset that 
would enable them to be effective resisters. 
Moscow began to exert a strong influence on the French Communist Party, which 
steadily increased as the 1930s wore on and resulted in the PCF’s refusal to engage or even 
criticise the Nazis during the first phase of the war, at Moscow’s behest. Comintern money 
financed almost all PCF expenditure and resulted in the PCF leadership serving the interests 
of their financers first, even when they did not align with those of party members: 
“Dependence on the flow of Soviet money, which could be withdrawn at any time, secured 
                                                     
1
 S. McMeekin, “From Moscow to Vichy: Three Working-Class Militants and the French Communist Party, 
1920-1940,” Contemporary European History 9, no. 1 (2000): 16. 
2
 Ibid., 27. 
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Bolsheviks' direct control of PCF policy.”
3
 The Comintern had also decreed that the PCF 
would implement the controversial electoral policy of class against class, which included 
attacking the Socialists and thereby weakening the French left.
4
 It was the Popular Front 
though that confirmed Moscow’s total control of the PCF.  PCF policy was made subservient 
to Soviet foreign policy, “Stalin was changing tactics for specific geopolitical reasons, in 
order to strengthen the left in France and secure a military alliance against Hitler.”
5
  The 
PCF’s meek acquiescence to this complete change in tactics is proof of the loss of its ability 
to make independent decisions and policies.
6
 It is quite fair to say then that any credit or 
benefit that the PCF obtained for the Popular Front government was unearned, given that the 
decision came from the Comintern. Blind obedience to Moscow’s edicts was the key to 
advancing in the PCF and this is personified by its leader, Maurice Thorez, who would 
“never express an opinion without first discussing the issue with Eugen Fried, the 
Comintern's local party overseer.”
7
 When one acknowledges that the Popular Front was 
encouraged by Moscow with the intention of forming an alliance against Hitler, it is quite 
remarkable that Stalin signed a pact with Hitler that arguably paved the way for the Germans 
to invade France. The self-serving nature of Moscow was clear and the policies that it forced 
on the PCF in the 1930s can be seen as precursors towards the non-aggression policy forced 
on French communists until the summer of 1941.  
When criticising the Communists for failing to launch an armed resistance before 
Operation Barbarossa, it is important to note that there was little to no armed resistance from 
other groups or parties either. The French Resistance grew in size and strength as the war 
continued and, when this is acknowledged, it is possible to see the French communists’ so-
called late entry into the war a bit differently. It is also necessary to highlight the actions 
taken by Daladier’s government against the French communists in retaliation for the Nazi-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The French government “began a full-scale persecution of the 
PCF, banning L’Humanite, arresting communist deputies, dissolving the party and sending 
leading militants to prison camps.”
8
 It can be argued, from a French communist’s perspective 
that an armed struggle that simply returned the previous regime was not worth fighting for. 
This can be furthered with the insistence by the Comintern that the war was an imperialist 
war and that France was an aggressor, not Germany. A legitimate response by the Communist 
Party when asked why it did not order its members to resist would be: “when did any 
delegation of the Socialist Party tell its members to engage in armed resistance?”
9
 It is 
necessary to point out a certain double standard when accusations are levelled at the PCF. It 
has been estimated that no less than two percent of the French population (about 400,000 
people) were active resisters, while ten percent of the French population were passive 
resisters.
10
 Statistics like these show not only the resistance myth and the importance of the 
Communists to the Resistance, but also that it is unfair to judge the Communists’ war record 
too harshly considering that the vast majority of the French people chose to passively 
collaborate.  
                                                     
3
 Ibid., 3. 
4
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8
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“In the twelve months that followed the armistice and the establishment of the Vichy 
government, communist resistance in France accomplished very little of note”.
11
 Until May 
1941, the illegal PCF’s activities consisted of reconstructing its party cells and distributing its 
clandestine publications, particularly L’Humanite, which had also been banned by Daladier’s 
government.
12
 The PCF press almost never mentioned the fact of the occupation and 
obviously carried no call for active opposition to the German presence.
13
 To give some credit 
to the Communists during this period, they were clear in their disdain for Petain and their 
rejection of Vichy ideology.
14
 Their views on Petain were to be proved correct when his 
purge of the political left soon extended to include Jews and Freemasons, groups that did not 
conform to Petain’s Revolution Nationale vision.
15
 L’Humanite was one of the few 
publications to denounce Vichy for its anti-Semitism, which can be found in its Marseille 
edition of October 1940.
16
 French communists did much to assist the Jews throughout the 
war, which will be discussed later. What can be said positively about the Communists during 
this time is that some communist resistance pockets did form, in the Occupied Zone rather 
than in Vichy, but not in Paris and without contact with the PCF leaders in the capital.
17
 
These pockets, in Nantes, Bordeaux and the region of Limoges, began by distributing anti-
Nazi pamphlets, and by the end of August 1940 had progressed to small acts of sabotage.
18
 
Sources from both Vichy and the Germans indicate to us the lack of communist activity 
during this period. The French prefects' reports reveal that communist resistance until the 
summer of 1941 consisted almost entirely of the printing and distribution of propaganda.
19
 
The Wehrmacht reports from 1940 reveal that three German divisions in France reported on 
the lack of attacks by Communists on the occupying forces, while in May 1941, a report from 
the commandant of German troops in Paris attributed the majority of acts of sabotage in the 
area to the non-communist resistance.
20
 While this proves to us the lack of communist 
resistance at this time, it also shows the impact of the PCF on its members, as, generally 
speaking, the vast majority of its members adhered to its policy of non-aggression towards 
the Nazis. It shows the organisation and discipline of its members, which would become a big 
advantage for the Resistance once the Communists entered the war.  
The Party began negotiating with the Germans in the months directly following the 
armistice to get its popular newspaper L’Humanite legalised again.
21
 This fact was quite 
embarrassing to the PCF in later years for it showed its willingness to co-operate with the 
Germans. The question of whether to negotiate with the Germans was taken up by Thorez, 
the head of the PCF.  In telegrams sent by him, he urged the Party to essentially remain 
neutral in the conflict.
22
 Thorez spent the war in Moscow and he instructed his 
representatives in France not to engage at all with either the Nazis or Vichy, as he believed 
the Nazis desired to use the Communists to control the working class. He cautioned them 
against negotiating with the Germans on this point as he suggested that this would assist the 
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Nazis in tainting by association the only organised, honest political force left in France: the 
Communist Party.
23
 The request was refused, but this and the communist leaders, Francois 
Billoux’s and Virgile Barel’s offers to serve as witnesses in the trials of Léon Blum, Prime 
Minister of France during the Popular Front government of the mid 1930s, and Édouard 
Daladier, Prime Minister of France at the outbreak of the war, in Riom (which was refused by 
Vichy and would have seen the Communists testify against their former Popular Front allies 
and also assist Vichy) serves to prove the extent of the communist collaboration.
24
 Any fears 
at this stage that the Germans may have had of the Communists were not caused by anything 
the Communists actually did, but rather simply because they were communists. There was no 
appeal to engage in violence by the PCF, and no violent action by a communist appears in the 
communist press until after 22 June 1941.
25
 Any communist then that actively struggled 
against the Nazis before this date”acted not merely without the Party's backing, but in open 
violation of the Party's orders.”
26
 Madeleine Baudoin, a resistance fighter from Marseille, 
discussed the strangeness of the PCF’s stance during this period in an interview with Rod 
Kedward. She states that the Communists in her locality were hostile to Vichy and Petain, but 




The German invasion of the Soviet Union secured the PCF’s total commitment to any 
and all forms of action against the Nazis, for it now had the permission of the Comintern to 
do so. The Communists were in quite a healthy position to do this, as they were somewhat 
prepared for the probability of hostilities commencing and were organised and moderately 
armed.  Thorez’s tone completely changed in his telegram from 25
 
June 1941, where he urged 
both collaboration and contact with Gaullist resistance on the basis of national liberation. He 
also declares that action must be taken in both zones, against the Nazis and against Vichy 
who he referred to as traitors. He suggested that strikes be used to hinder any factory that was 
used to support the German military in its war against the Soviet Union and that the 
Communist Party should promote the war as a war against Fascist aggression, rather than a 
defence of communism, in order to secure wider support and co-operation.
28
 The 
Communists were the first to begin the assassination of German soldiers, the first being 
carried out by Colonel Fabien at Barbes metro station on 21 August 1941.
29
  Subsequent 
assassinations which occurred in Lille, Nantes and Bordeaux, left the Germans in no doubt 
that different tactics were needed now that the Communists had entered the war. Communist 
resisters were generally accepted as being by far the most eager to actually fight the Germans 
and were arguably more useful to the Allies because of this. The PCF united its disparate 
armed groups into a single organisation, the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Francais (FTP). The 
FTP, led by Charles Tillon, soon began recruiting volunteers in all the main towns, creating a 
series of potent guerrilla squads.
30
 The adoption of guerrilla tactics was necessary since the 
PCF knew that it would have no chance against the Germans in a sustained battle, particularly 
in 1941-2 when the German Army had an aura of invincibility attached to it. The PCF 
launched the Front National, influenced somewhat by the success of the Popular Front, which 
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was used to attract non-communist partisans into active resistance.
31
 The FTP operated with a 
large degree of autonomy particularly at this juncture, for the principle concern of the 
Communists was to keep as many German divisions in France as possible, so that they were 
not fighting in the East against the Soviet Union.  
FTP armed action did incur German Army reprisals, which were generally inflicted 
on the population where the incident took place. The impact that FTP action and German 
reprisals had could be quite varied. A decree by Hitler issued on 16 September 1941 stated 
that the death of a German soldier should be followed by the execution of 50 to 100 
communists.
32
 A hostage plan was then implemented in France, where the Nazis 
unsurprisingly made a point of placing former deputies and officials of the PCF at the top of 
the hostage lists. These former deputies and officials were closely followed on the lists by 
intellectuals who had shown support for communism. In total, each district was to have 
identified around 150 hostages, while 300-400 were chosen for Paris.
33
 Although Hitler’s 
order stated that the people to be executed were to be communists, in reality a significant 
number of those executed had no links to the PCF or to communism in general. Communist 
assassinations then had the potential to cause anger in the areas where an assassination was 
carried out and could actually do more harm to the Resistance than good, particularly if the 
assassin was not a local. The ambiguity of the effectiveness of the assassination programme 
as a tactic can be seen in the effect of the assassination of Lieutenant-Colonel Hotz, the 
Feldkommandant of Nantes on 20 October 1941. The gunman was Gilbert Brustlein, a 
communist, who had recently come by train from Paris to Nantes to continue the campaign 
against German military personnel.
34
 The population of Nantes was horrified by the 
assassination. Hotz was seen to be much more of a gentleman officer than a Nazi, and there 




October forty-eight people were 
shot by the Germans, and the forty-eight fell into three distinct groups: twenty-seven 
communists from the Chateaubriant camp, sixteen prisoners in Nantes including six veterans' 
leaders, and five Nantais held at Fort Romainville in Paris.
36
  In order to avoid a further fifty 
executions, the local authorities became closer collaborators with the Germans.
37
 The 
assassination of Hotz was met with anger by the locals, particularly the relatives of the forty-
eight, with the gunman forever seen by many of them as a killer rather than a resister.
38
 This 
began a debate among resistance groups of the benefits of this kind of action, considering the 
threat to resistance support that can occur in local populations, given the severity of the 
German reaction to assassinations.
39
 While in many cases assassinations and the German 
reprisals in response worked in the Resistance’s favour, Brustlein’s act was not highlighted 
by the PCF because of the unpopularity of his deed.
40
 In total, 30,000 people were executed 
over the course of the war by the Germans in response to resistance operations.
41
 With a 
casualty list this high, there was always going to be some local anger at the Resistance, but 
the disruption and fear that the constant attacks had on the occupying forces, as well as the 
significant German Army presence in France as a result, arguably justified this tactic. 
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The German occupation of the whole of France in November 1942, as well as the 
extension of the STO programme, had a dramatic effect on the war and on communist 
resistance. German rule and brutality was then felt in areas of France that had been shielded 
from it by the existence of Vichy and so resistance activity and support by the French in the 
south began to increase.
42
 Before 1943, resistance activity and particularly communist 
resistance activity was generally focused on the cities, where it was easier to hide and there 
was access to a ready stream of recruits.
43
 The French countryside was where communist 
support was traditionally at its weakest, so the extension of the STO programme to include 
farm labourers was a significant act in the war, since it also dealt a severe blow to the support 
of Vichy and Petain. This policy caused a surge in the numbers of the Maquis, a rural 
resistance movement that used guerrilla warfare tactics, with the majority of its members 
being under twenty-five and working class.
44
 The FTP Maquis soon became very strong and 
Vichy administrators were unable to enter and mayors began to resign in areas where it had 
control.
45
 The men of the Maquis generally had a strong desire to fight, and so had a choice to 
join either the FTP or one of the groups that made up the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance 
(MUR). The FTP was known to be the group more committed to direct action, usually in 
small mobile groups, while the MUR regarded itself as an army in waiting for a future 
battle.
46
 It is no surprise then that many who chose to join the FTP were not communists and 
there was a real sense among the MUR and the Free French that they were losing the 
initiative to the FTP.
47
 The progression in hostilities can be seen in the difference in the 
number of armed actions by the FTP-MOI group in Paris. It carried out sixteen armed actions 
against the Nazis in the second half of 1942, while in the first half of 1943 this rose to forty-
three.
48
 This not only served as a major irritation to the Nazis, but it also assisted in the FTP’s 
recruitment, particularly among Eastern European immigrants who mainly joined communist 
organised urban groups due to their notorious proclivity for direct action. The sacrifice of 
these communist immigrants when they were captured often had a very positive effect on 




The bravery of the communist resister in carrying out armed actions can be seen in 
Walter Lipgens’ insistence that a group that attempted such action was committing suicide. 
Until 1944, because the totalitarian police and control apparatus remained effective, terror-
actions were extremely difficult and almost impossible to get away with.
50
 Fatalities in the 
networks due to betrayal and German counter-measures were huge, and this was especially 
true for communist resistance groups as their high profile and willingness to kill Nazis made 
them arguably the recipient of the most attention by the Germans. The Communists were also 
involved in the saving of Jews and it can be estimated that they saved thousands of lives 
through networks of escape and safe houses.
51
 Lipgens says that the main activities of 
resistance groups between 1940 and 1944 consisted of two things: sheltering persecuted 
people and printing underground literature that highlighted the crimes and injustices of the 
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Nazi regime.
52
 This, however, is unfair to the armed activity of the Communists and the huge 
role they played in the liberation of Corsica, which occurred in 1943. The liberation of 
Corsica in October of that year was accomplished by armed resisters who were mostly 
attached to the National Front, which had a significant communist core.
53
 While it can be 
argued that the PCF was keen to liberate Corsica in order to accelerate the war on the 
Western Front and thereby reduce the pressure on the USSR, it was also a massive 
propaganda victory for the Communists and increased their profile both in France and 
abroad.
54
 In total the liberation of Corsica left 75 French, 245 Italians and 1,000 Germans 
dead.
55
 The confidence that this gave the Communists cannot be overstated. The 
Communists’ liberation of Corsica proved their immense value and position in the resistance; 
it also showed that they were loyal to the Gaullist vision by their restraint and their setting up 
of a coalition of resistance forces to run the island until the end of the war.
56
  
As can be seen in their actions in Corsica, the Communists were becoming slowly 
more integrated into the Resistance, while still retaining a large degree of autonomy. The 
integration of resistance movements began first with the MUR in the south in January of 
1943, but Jean Moulin, the great unifier of the French resistance groups who later became the 
symbol of the Resistance, quickly realised that the FTP and Front National were becoming so 
infamous and successful that they were attracting non-communists into their ranks. 
Accordingly, he recommended to de Gaulle that they also be integrated into a centralised 
resistance, the Conseil National de la Resistance (CNR).
57
 In reality very little changed as the 
local FTP commanders were still in charge of their troops, there was simply greater 
integration and co-operation between the resistance groups. Communists became further 
united with the other resistance members following their inclusion into the Comite Francais 
de Liberation Nationale (CFLN) in April of 1944 and in the Provisional Government that was 




 Fernand Grenier, who had arrived in London in January 1943 as 
the PCF's official delegate to La France Combattante, had “confirmed the goodwill and co-
operative attitude, however relative they might be, of the PCF and would enter the 
Provisional Government as ‘commissaire a lair’ in April 1944.”
59
 The setting up of the CFLN 
integrated the Communists into the political apparatus of the Resistance, while its military 
wing, the FTP, was integrated into the French Forces of the Interior (FFI).
60
 The inclusion of 
the FTP in this organisation is important as by then the FTP was unquestionably the largest 
military group in the Resistance. As well as giving the FFI greater legitimacy with the 
inclusion of the Communists, the western Allies and de Gaulle were still afraid of a 
communist revolution, so their integration was important to ensure that this did not happen. 
This fear was not exactly irrational as the PCF for most of the 1930s and 1940s had been 
operating much more as communists than as Frenchmen. 
An evaluation of the Communists’ relationship with the Resistance overall must look 
in depth at its relationship with de Gaulle, for de Gaulle’s influence particularly in the war’s 
closing years began to grow exponentially. De Gaulle was arguably friendlier with the USSR 
than he might normally have been, given the ideological differences, but the USSR did 
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recognise de Gaulle's Free French Committee before Britain.
61
 De Gaulle made certain 
gestures to the Communists to show that they were an included and valued member of the 
Resistance. De Gaulle adopted the PCF's slogan 'national liberation cannot be separated from 
national insurrection'
62
, while also accepting the Communists’ call for a purge and even the 
trial and imprisonment of various former officials and supporters of Vichy still in Algeria, the 
most relevant of them being Pierre Pucheu.
63
 Although cracks did occur between de Gaulle 
and the PCF, both realised that the unity of the resistance groups was vital for the successful 
expulsion of the enemy, and de Gaulle knew that he needed the support of the PCF to gain 
greater respect from the Allies as the Resistance’s acknowledged head. De Gaulle and the 
PCF were both aware of and operated within the belief that the world during the war years 
had become quite simple, the Fascists were on one side and anyone willing to fight them was 
allied, for now, against them. 
The Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 activated and energised the 
Resistance further, for it was their task to slow the Germans down by immobilising railways 
and cutting telephone lines.
64
 The FTP was also tasked with engaging the enemy in order to 
tie German soldiers down and prevent them from being moved to Normandy to assist in the 
repelling of the invasion.
65
 The PCF was anxious for this invasion to get underway, for it was 
still subservient to the needs of the Soviet Union and the opening up of a new theatre of war 
was a sure way of securing a Fascist defeat. The FTP continued its guerrilla tactics, which 
angered the Germans into severe reprisals against the locals, such as in Tulle where ninety-
nine random men were publicly hanged.
66
 The consequence of reprisals like these was that 
tens of thousands of people joined the Resistance in the last stages of the liberation to finally 
push the Nazis out.
67
 The PCF’s effort in the war was shown by the inclusion of Charles 




 The PCF showed its commitment to the idea of a united resistance and a 
liberated France by its disbanding of its armed police force, the Milices Patriotiques.
69
 The 
impact of this on the relationship between the Communists and de Gaulle can be seen in de 
Gaulle’s pardon of the PCF leader, Thorez, for deserting and spending the year in Moscow.  




It is clear that French communist involvement in World War Two is complicated. The 
experiences of the PCF in the 1920s and 1930s at the hands of the French government had 
made it the ideal organisation to begin resisting the Nazis, since it was so used to acting 
clandestinely. The PCF’s subsequent domination by the Comintern, though, resulted in it 
acquiescing meekly to Moscow’s edicts. The consequence of this was that the PCF was 
forced to be cordial to the Nazis until June of 1941 and it is an embarrassment that it has been 
attempting to justify since the outbreak of the war. The Communists, however, were not 
necessarily late in joining the war; indeed it is possible to say that the Resistance as we know 
it only truly began when the Communists entered the war. Their willingness to actively 
engage the enemy became known both in and outside of France, with successes like the 
                                                     
61




 Bennett, “Aragon’s ‘Le Crime Contre L’esprit’,” 576. 
64






 Ibid., 301. 
68
 Ibid., 276. 
69
 Ibid., 279. 
70
 Ibid. 
   Eoin McManus   •   32 
   
liberation of Corsica adding real impetus and confidence to their activities. The assassination 
tactics that the Communists used did have certain drawbacks, for example, some 30,000 
civilians were executed by the Nazis in retaliation for assassinations and these turned local 
populations against the Resistance. The Communists soon became the largest and most 
important group in the Resistance and so their integration was greatly desired by Moulin and 
then de Gaulle. The integration of the Communists into the Resistance can be seen in the FFI 
becoming synonymous with the Resistance as a whole and their initials were seen all over the 
country.
71
 The perception of the Communists as being separate from the other groups in the 
Resistance began to diminish, and this is seen in much of the writing on the war where, after 
the Normandy landings, there is evidence of historians commenting on FFI activity instead of 
FTP activity. It is imperative not to overstate the importance of the French Resistance though, 
as only Albania and Yugoslavia were actually liberated by their resistance groups.
72
 What can 
be said with certainty of the communist resistance in France is that it prevented greater 
casualties among the Allies, through its acts of sabotage and its engagement of the enemy. 
The change in the perception of the Communists can be seen in their impressive electoral 
achievement in the post-war elections, when they became the largest French party in the 
country and in the National Assembly. It had also become a truly national party with at least 
one deputy returned in virtually each district, making it the most nationally established of all 
French parties.
73
 The difficulty in assessing this period can be seen in the Communists’ 
attempts to deceive the French public by trying to take a larger share of the credit for the 
earlier years of resistance than they were due.
74
 Despite the attempted misinformation that is 
to be expected really, the Communists were still the most important resistance group. When 
contrasting communist resistance with the rest of the Resistance, one must acknowledge there 
is a marked difference in the reasons both had for fighting and in what they hoped to achieve 
by resisting. For the rest of the Resistance, the cause and aim can be stated simply, a free 
France, while the French Communists’ lack of action before 1941 proves their motives were 
different and that the loyalty of the PCF, and particularly the Party leadership, was to the 
Soviet Union. The Communists’ ideologically motivated decision to withhold entry into the 
war until June of 1941 and the dubious loyalty this showed are important points to highlight, 
yet the PCF still had the greatest influence of any group in the Resistance, to the extent that 
communists became synonymous with the Resistance in the memory of the French people. 
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